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CASE COMMENTS
Morris: Housing Codes:
Court Determination of Reasonableness

HOUSING CODES: COURT DETERMINATION OF
REASONABLENESS
Safer v. City of Jacksonville, 237 So. 2d 8 (1st D.C.A. Fla 1970)
The defendant city found that rental dwellings owned by plaintiffs
violated seventy provisions of the Jacksonville Housing Code, including one
requiring a lavatory and hot water facilities,1 and ordered compliance with
the code or vacation of the premises. After exhausting administrative appeals,
plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment to invalidate both the enabling
statute2 and the housing code itself,3 and sought to enjoin the city from
enforcing the code against their properties. The trial court upheld both
laws and denied all relief.4 Plaintiffs contended on appeal that the entire
code was invalid because it unconstitutionally delegated legislative power
to an administrative board, and alternatively that its application to plaintiffs
was unconstitutional. The First District Court of Appeal affirmed the overall validity of the ordinance but reversed the trial court and HELD, to
require installation of lavatories, hot water heaters, and convenience electrical
outlets in the particular dwelling units operated for plaintiffs5 would be
unreasonable and thus an unconstitutional confiscation of property without
compensation. 6
The traditional common law rule in landlord-tenant relationships is
caveat emptor. There exists no implied warranty at common law concerning
1. JACKSONVILLE, FLA., Minsrsus

HousING CODE §302

(1967) provides in part: "(e)

Every dwelling unit shall have connected to the kitchen, sink, lavatory, and tub or shower
an adequate supply of both cold water and hot water. All water shall be supplied through
an approved pipe distribution system connected to a potable water supply. (f All hot water
heating facilities shall be installed according to the Jacksonville Plumbing Code and shall be
capable of supplying a continuous source of hot water, on demand, to all the required
fixtures at a temperature of not less than 120 [degrees] Fahrenheit."

2. Fla. Laws 1967, ch. 1576, §2, at 2245, provide in part: "Jacksonville, in order to protect the health, safety and welfare of the residents of the city, by ordinance may provide
for the repair, maintenance or vacation of buildings or structures which are deemed unfit
for human habitation and dangerous and injurious to the health, safety or welfare of the
residents of the city by establishing and enforcing reasonable minimum housing standards
. . . for plumbing systems and equipment, light and ventilation, electrical systems . . .
sanitation facilities." Brief for Appellant at 33-34, Safer v. City of Jacksonville, 237 So. 2d
8 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1970) acknowledges that the city had the general power through its
charter to enact the housing code, and the enabling act was necessary only for the provision of the Code concerning demolition of buildings and establishment of a Board of
Adjustments and Appeals.
3. JACKSONVILLE, FLA., MIINIMUM HousING CODE (1967).
4. The city had agreed to stipulate as a question of fact for the jury whether the
seventy alleged violations adversely affected the health or safety of tenants. The jury found
that fifty of the alleged defects either did not exist or did not jeopardize the tenants' health
or safety. The lack of hot water facilities was in the latter category. The jury found that
nineteen defects had been cured, and prior to trial court judgment, the remaining defect
was repaired by plaintiff. 237 So. 2d 8, 11 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1970).
5. The eight dwellings involved were held in trust to provide the sole income for
two elderly maiden daughters of the prior owner. 237 So. 2d 8, 10 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1970).
6. 237 So. 2d 8 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1970).
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the condition of a dwelling,7 nor is there any obligation, unless specified in
a lease, to keep leased premises in good repair.8 In the late nineteenth
century, however, state legislatures and city governments began to impose
statutory duties upon landlords to eliminate health hazards and fire traps
in tenements. 9 In an early case involving an ordinance that required a
water supply on each floor of a tenement house, the court held that an
otherwise proper exercise of the police power was not invalid merely because
compliance was costly to the landlord.1 0 Although housing standards have
become more stringent, this has remained the general rule even when a
new law is applied to existing buildings., Where a new ordinance required
improved fire safety equipment in tenements, the United States Supreme
Court failed even to consider the need for the ordinance, terming the police
power one of the "least limitable" of governmental powers, often controlling
property rights.' 2 All courts, however, limit the scope of municipal ordi3
nances by applying the test of reasonableness.'
The Florida supreme court has stated that constitutional guarantees
of property rights should remain stable, but they also must bend "with
the realm of reasonableness" to accommodate public welfare.' 4 Governments
may exercise their police power to "impose reasonable restrictions on the use
of property in the interest of public health, safety and welfare. . .. -15 A
person who challenges an ordinance must show that it is unreasonable either
on its face or as applied to him. 16 In determining reasonableness, Florida
courts have repeatedly held that courts should not substitute their judgment
for that of the legislative body when reasonableness is fairly debatable. 17
7. H. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY §99 (3d ed. 1939).
8. Id. §101.
9. The statutes were grounded in the general police power. Wood, The Development,
Objective, and Adequacy of Current Housing Code Standards, in HousrNo CODE STANDARDS:
TiREm CRMiCAL STUMrEs 1 (National Commission on Urban Problems Research Rep. No.
19 (1969)).
10. Health Dep't v. Rector of Trinity Church, 145 N.Y. 32, 39 N.E. 8a3 (1895).
11. Queenside Hills Realty CO. v. Saxl, 328 U.S. 80 (1946); Sharrow v. City of Dania,
83 So. 2d 274 (Fla. 1955); Setzer v. Mayo, 150 Fla. 734, 9 So. 2d 280 (1942); Adamec v. Post,
273 N.Y. 250, 7 N.E.2d 120 (1937). See generally Gribetz & Grad, Housing Code Enforcement: Sanctions and Remedies, 66 COLUm. L. REv. 1254, 1271 (1966); Mandelker, Housing
Codes, Building Demolition, and Just Compensation: A Rationale for the Exercise of
Public Powers over Slum Housing, 67 MicH. L. Rr v. 635, 649 (1969).
12. Queenside Hills Realty Co. v. Saxl, 328 U.S. 80, 82 (1946). As in the instant case,
one defense was that current facilities were inadequate.
13. See, e.g., Adamec v. Post, 273 N.Y. 250, 260-61, 7 N.E.2d 120, 125 (1937), which
held: "[S]ubject to reasonable limitation, the Legislature may determine what alterations
should be required and what conditions may constitute a menace to the public welfare
and call for remedy."
14. Sunad, Inc. v. City of Sarasota, 122 So. 2d 611, 613 (Fla. 1960).
15. State ex rel. Wilcox v. T.O.L., Inc., 206 So. 2d 69, 71-72 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1968).
16. State ex rel. Harkow v. McCarthy, 126 Fla. 433, 438, 171 So. 314, 316 (1937).
17. Harrell's Candy Kitchen, Inc. v. Sarasota-Manatee Airport Authority, 111 So. 2d
439 (Fla. 1959); Inman v. City of Miami, 197 So. 2d 50, 52 (3d D.C.A. Fla.), cert. denied,
201 So. 2d 895 (Fla. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1048 (1968); Lester v. City of St. Petersburg, 183 So. 2d 589 (2d D.C.A. Fla.), appeal dismissed, 190 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 1966).
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In Bay View Investments, Inc. v. Grigsby the Florida supreme court said:

8

Judicial restraint requires that the making of city ordinances be left
to duly authorized city officials. If the policy expressed in those ordinances is fairly debatable we judges should accord city councils the
right to adopt policies which we may think wrong.
Similarly, courts generally do not overturn the determination of an administrative agency unless the agency's findings are contrary to law, arbitrary
or capricious, or unsupported by substantial evidence. 9
Although the principal issue in the instant case-whether requiring
installation of hot water facilities in rental dwellings is reasonable - is apparently one of first impression in Florida, other jurisdictions have reached
conflicting results. In finding a legitimate exercise of police power, decisions
upholding hot water ordinances have emphasized the health and sanitary
2
aspects of pressurized hot water.20 In City of Louisville v. Thompson, 1 the
court relied upon sociological contentions that prevention of urban blight
obviously relates to public health, safety, morals, and welfare and asserted that
a house without decent bathing facilities is conducive to disease and delinquency. On the other hand, some courts, noting a lack of proof that health,
safety, or welfare would be impaired by noncompliance, have held that hot
22
water requirements constitute an unreasonable demand upon landlords.
The difference in the two groups of cases may be based in part on the amount
of evidence presented at trial to show a connection between hot water and
public health or welfare. In City of Columbus v. Stubbs,23 the court stated
a factual
that a legislative finding was not enough; there must also be
24
determination of health impairment caused by lack of hot water.
The importance of the instant case and others like it extends beyond
the immediate parties. Congress and federal housing officials have emphasized
housing codes as a means of curing urban slums. For example, the National
Housing Act of 195425 required that the federal government consider whether
a locality has adequate standards of health, sanitation, and safety for buildings on the distribution of federal housing and urban renewal funds. Although "adequate" is not defined in the act, the Federal Housing Adminis-

18. 219 So. 2d 760, 762 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1969).
19. Zabel v. Tabb, 296 F. Supp. 764 (M.D. Fla. 1969).
20. Wheat v. Ramsey, 224 So. 2d 649 (Ala. 1969); City of Louisville v. Thompson, 339
SAV.2d 869 (Ky. Ct. App. 1960); Givner v. Commissioner of Health, 207 Md. 184, 113 A.2d
899 (1955); Paquette v. City of Fall River, 338 Mass. 368, 155 N.E.2d 775 (1959).
21. 339 S.W.2d 869 (Ky. Ct. App. 1960).
22. City of Columbus v. Stubbs, 223 Ga. 765, 158 S.E.2d 392 (1967); Dente v. City of
Mount Vernon, 50 Misc. 2d 983, 272 N.Y.S.2d 65 (Westchester County Sup. Ct. 1966); Gates
Co. v. Housing Appeals Bd., 10 Ohio St. 2d 48, 225 N.E.2d 222 (1967).
23. 10 Ohio St. 2d 48, 225 N.E.2d 222 (1967). But see City of Louisville v. Thompson,

359 S.W.2d 869 (Ky. Ct. App. 1960).
24. In the instant case the defendant city stipulated that the jury could make a factual
determination of impairment.
25. 42 U.S.C. §1451 (a) (1964).
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tration considers as "substandard" any dwelling without hot running water.28
In the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1964,27 Congress specified
that no local, workable program for urban renewal should be certified to
receive federal funds unless the city had a minimum standard housing code
and had been enforcing it for at least six months.
Since 1962 at least five Florida cities and one county have adopted
housing code provisions containing requirements for hot water facilities
similar to the Jacksonville provision. 28 These cities are by no means unique.
A 1969 survey of four national and regional model housing codes, nine
state codes, and sixteen city codes revealed that all but two of the state
codes and two of the city codes provided for a private or semiprivate flush
toilet, lavatory, sink, and bathtub or shower serviced with hot and cold
water.

29

The results of the survey indicate that many public officials and governmental agencies believe it is reasonable to require hot water. Yet, in the
instant case the court decided that a continuous supply of hot water was not
"reasonably" required to protect the health, safety, or welfare of the tenants.3 0
The opinion asserted that a lack of modem facilities did not harm our nation's forefathers and that hot water was required today primarily for
aesthetic reasons. The opinion characterized the requirement not only as
unreasonable but also as constituting an unconstitutional confiscation of
appellants' property3s
26. Sutermeister, Inadequacies and Inconsistencies in the Definition of Substandard
Housing, in HousING CODE STANDARDS: THREE CRUTICAL STrUDI
87 (National Commission
on Urban Problems Research Rep. 19 (1969)). According to A. ESSEX-CARTER, A SYNOPSIS
OF PUBLIC HEALTH AND SOCIAL MEDICINE 450 (2d ed. 1967), the British Housing Act of 1964
authorizes local governments to deal compulsorily with houses that are substandard because
of deficient amenities such as hot and cold water.
27. 42 U.S.C. §1451 (c) (1969). Between 1954 and 1964 more than 650 cities adopted
housing codes. Note, Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 HARv. L. REV. 801, 803
(1965).
28.
2 FORT LAUDERDALE, FLA., CODE §C-1824(8), at 1513 (1962); FORT PIERCE, FLA.,
CODE §17A-4(4.01) (1965); GAINESVILLE, FLA., CODE §15A-118 (1966); METROPOLUTAN DADE
COUNTY, FLA., CODE, art. I, §17.23 (1963); MIAMI, FLA., MINIMUM HOUSING STANDARDS, art. II,
§17.59 (1968); TAMPA, FLA., CODE §20A-13 (8) (1963).
29. Wood, supra note 9, at 24, 53.
30. 237 So. 2d 8, 13 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1970).
31. "To hold in the affirmative would do violence to the history of our country, in the
early history of which hearty citizens were reared and grew to maturity under living conditions which included bathing in a bowl supplied by a water pitcher placed upon a washstand in the bedroom, and under which all hot water used by the family was heated in
a kettle, pot, or tub on the kitchen stove. Research fails to reveal any substantial number
of instances in which living under these conditions adversely affected the health, safety or
morals of our forebears, or indeed many of the older generation living today. The paternalistic trend in government is gradually forcing a surrender of the living conditions
commonplace in the 'good old days' for more modern concepts of living which frequently
are influenced more by aesthetic considerations than those relating to health, safety, or
welfare. To require the installation of lavoratories [sic], hot water heaters and convenience
electrical outlets in all of the low rent dwelling units owned by appellants would not
only be unreasonable, but constitute a confiscation of appellants' property without
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The court also weighed the landlord's contention that 19,000 dollars
was needed to cure the defects alleged by the city, against the assessed property valuation of 40,000 dollars. 32 Concerning this issue the court adopted
the philosophy of Mr. Justice Holmes that the police power may be used
to impose some limitations on property rights but that a point is reached
where a "taking" occurs and eminent domain procedures are necesssary. 33
Although this rule is well-settled, using it to uphold property rights over
human rights34 may be questionable. In the two cases cited in the instant
opinion, Mr. Justice Holmes upheld governmental exercise of police power
to limit property rights,3 5 not human rights. Moreover, he said the mere fact
that tangible property is visible should not entitle it to more protection
from police power than other rights deserve.3 6 The United States Supreme
Court has stated "there is no set formula to determine where regulation ends
and taking begins,"37 and other jurisdictions have expressed varying, but
generally similiar views. 38 In a case originating in Florida, the United States
Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, affirmed the application of a new zoning
ordinance that banned a recently constructed gasoline service station and
held that considerations of financial loss or property rights cannot outweigh a
legitimate exercise of the police power. 39
If the cost of compliance is not the decisive factor, the issue is
whether a court could find requirements for automatic hot showers or baths
a "fairly debatable" necessity for health or welfare. Considering scientific
evidence, public policy, and the number of cities that have adopted these
requirements it is difficult to understand how the court failed to find the
question fairly debatable. Yet, in the instant case the court apparently found
that the hardship to the plaintiffs so outweighed the needs of the tenants that
the application of the ordinance was unreasonable despite the "fairly
debatable" rule.
compensation contrary to basic constitutional rights. The cost of compliance bears no
reasonable relationship to the objects to be attained." Id. at 13.
82. Id. at 10.
83. Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 156 (1921); Rideout v. Knox, 148 Mass. 368, 372-73, 19
N.E. 390, 392 (1889).
34. Calling the right to an automatic hot bath a "human right" seems reasonable in
light of the number of officials and authorities who consider it a necessity. It would seem
also that housing codes attempt to guarantee such a right by legislative enactment.
35. In Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921), the police power was held sufficient to regulate leases in an emergency and in Rideout v. Knox, 148 Mass. 368, 19 N.E. 390 (1889), it
was held sufficient to regulate the height of spite fences.
36. Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 155 (1921).
87. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962).
38. The New York Court of Appeals has held that the proportion of cost of the
alteration to the value of the property is not determinative as to the reasonableness of
applying the regulation. Adamec v. Post, 273 N.Y. 250, 260, 7 N.E.2d 120, 124 (1937).
However, the Illinois supreme court has stated that the issue in police power regulation
cases is whether property owners suffer "unreasonable exactions" compared to public
benefits. Kaukas v. City of Chicago, 27 Ill. 2d 197, 201, 188 N.E.2d 700, 702 (1963).
89. Standard Oil Co. v. City of Tallahassee, 183 F.2d 410 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 340
U.S. 892 (1950).
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Authorities have concluded that hot water is needed for personal and
home cleanliness,40 and they have indicated that the "Victorian expedient"
of heating or carrying water is inadequate to assure sufficient quantities.47
An individual requires about twenty gallons a day2 at a temperature of at
least 100 degrees.43 The available scientific evidence appears more persuasive
than judicial recognition of the bathing habits of our forefathers, particularly
when it is noted that people living in this age of "aesthetic considerations"
live longer than their forefathers.
In 1949 Congress declared a public policy goal of a "decent home and
suitable living environment for every American family."' 4 However, it has
recently acknowledged that this goal remains unfulfilled,.5 and a House
committee has stated the "task of housing and urban development programs
is more critical than ever."48 The failure of code enforcement has received
part of the blame, with some of the failure attributed to a "lack of militancy
4
by both administrative and judicial officials." 7
Although the instant decision apparently finds the ordinance unconstitutional only as applied to plaintiffs, it may encourage other landlords to contest ordinance enforcement and discourage city officials from attempting to
enforce similar provisions. Where attempted enforcement is contested, administrative and judicial appeals may stall enforcement and perpetuate slum
conditions for several years. Such a result, based on a preference for the
bathing habits of our nation's forefathers and vitiating official attempts to
abate the squalor of modem-day slum life, seems to have little merit. The
New York Court of Appeals expressed a more forward-looking approach
48
thirty-three years ago:
During the last thirty-five years [since a previous tenement law] there
have been improvements in sanitation; new devices have been in40. Sutermeister, supra note 26, at 97-98: Wood, supranote 9, at 25.
41. V. EHLS & E. STEEL, MUNICIPAL AND RURAL SANITATION 433 (5th ed. 1958); Sutermeister, supra note 26, at 97-98.
42. 2 FORT LAUmRAL, FLA., CODE §C-1824(8). at 1513 (1965); V. EHLERS & E. STEL,
supra note 41, at 433.
43. MILWAUKEE HOUSING CODE AND INTERPRETATION §75-5(11), quoted in Sutermeister,
supra note 26, at 97-98, states in part: "Neither household nor personal cleanliness is
possible without hot water and an adequate supply must be considered a minimum requirement for healthful cleanliness and decency . ...
Water at a temperature of approximately

100 [degrees] is necessary for bathing as commonly practiced in our society and community.

Certain nationality groups prefer much hotter water for bathing, for instance, the Japanese
heat water to a temperature of 120 [degrees] or more and the Finns use steam baths where-

in the temperature is frequently close to 200 [degrees] F. Such extremes are unreasonable
in our society, however, but the water must be of such temperature as to avoid unduly

chilling the bather. Any water temperature less than body heat (98.6 [degrees] F.) is apt
to cause a chill."
44. Federal Housing Act of 1949, 42 U.S.C. §1441 (1964).
45. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 476.
46. House Committee on Banking and Currency Report, U. S. CODE CONG. & AD. Nzws
2873 (1968).
47. Sax & Hiestand, S1umlordism as a Tort, 65 MICH. L. REv. 868, 915 (1967).
48. Adamec v. Post, 273 N.Y. 250, 254, 7 N.E.2d 120, 121-22 (1937).
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